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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HIDDEN MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
NOS. 15027 
15157 
15188 
DEE MILLS, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents 
BRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, 
Appellant and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case presents unique issues for determination by the 
Court for which there is no precedence in this State, and very little 
authority from other jurisdictions. 
Basically the case involves a title dispute to some 542 
acres of land in the Heber Valley in Wasatch County, Utah. Not only 
are there important principles of law present, but there are also 
substantial values involved. 
The case has been before this Court on a prior occasion. 
In that case this Court reversed a decision of the lower court which 
held that an option to purchase the land in question was invalid. 
The events that occurred between the date of the Judgment of the 
lower court and the date of reversal by this Court give rise to this 
phase of the litigation. 
The first issue is the effect and duration of a Lis Pendens, 
a matter never before this Court. The second issue, should it be 
reached by the court, is whether a change of zoning secured by an 
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occupying claimant which enhances the value of property is 
element of damage to be awarded an occupying claimant. 
a Prc:j 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS I 
Dee Mills and Evelyn Mills, his wife, defendants, 
appellants, and respondents herein, owned, occupied, and famed 
land in question for many years. 
On December 28, 1964 Dee and Evelyn Mills granted~~ 
to East Heber Development Company, predecessor of the present pk~ 
tiff. The option was recorded that day (Ex. 1-P). Later a dispt;l 
arose between plaintiff and Mills concerning the validity of the 
option, and this extensive litigation ensued. \ 
December 
A chronology of dates and events is important. I 
28, 1964 Option from Mills to plaintiff's predecessor 
September 14, 1971 
October 15, 1971 
October 15, 1971 
October 15, 1971 
December 10, 1971 
December 10, 1971 
August 10, 1972 
Option from Mills to Mil ton C. Christensen 
(Ex. 5-P). 
Lis Pendens, East Heber Development Company ~· 
v. Dee Mills, et al (Ex. 3-P). 
Warranty Deed from Dee and Evelyn Mills to I 
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc. 
Warranty Deed from Dee and Evelyn Mills to I 
Lake Mills Company, a limited partnership. 
Amended Lis Pendens, Hidden Meadows Developr4 
v. Dee and Evelyn Mills. I 
Hidden Meadows Development Company commencei I 
suit seeking a Decree of Specific Perfun~ 
with respect to the 1964 option. l 
Lower court, Judge D. Frank Wilkins presidini 
entered Judgment for the defendants Dee Ml··.~ 
Evelyn Mills, Milton C. Christensen, .. 
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., and LakeM~ 
Company holding plaintiff's option to ben. 
and void. 
-2-
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August 10, 1972 
october 12, 1972 
November 29, 1972 
Notice of Appeal filed by plaintiff. 
Motion for Supersedeas filed by plaintiff. 
Order by Judge D. Frank Wilkins granting 
supersedeas in the amount of $50,000.00. 
(Note: Plaintiff did not post the $50,000.00 Supersedeas Bond.) 
January 3, 1973 
July 5, 1973 
Warranty Deeds from Lake Mills, a limited 
partnership, and Paradise Valley Estates, a 
corporation, convey to International 
Environmental Sciences. 
Decision of Supreme Court reversing lower court's 
decision (29 U2d 469, 511 P2d 737). 
Subsequent to the reversal by this Court, proceedings 
for specific performance and enforcement of that Decree were in-
stituted by plaintiff and a Supplemental Complaint was filed naming 
as additional parties those persons who acquired an interest in 
the real property subsequent to the original judgment by the lower 
court. The only party now challenged is Carole Lee Davis (now 
Christensen) and her limited partnership, International Environmental 
Sciences. Plaintiff has elected to acknowledge the validity of 
certain contract sales for small tracts of land sold by Inter-
national Environmental Sciences or its predecessor during the 
pendency of an appeal. Plaintiff does not, however admit that 
defendant had any title to convey. The sequence of events set forth 
above frames a fairly simple question, but one with complex and 
extremely important ramifications. 
Can a landowner convey a marketable title after a judgment 
in his favor during the pendency of an appeal? A subsidiary issue 
applicable to this case is raised by the fact that the adverse 
claimant moved the court to fix a supersedeas, but then failed to 
-3-
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I 
post the requisite bond. The conveyances here involved were 
sequent to those proceedings, but prior to the date on which 
sut.l 
'I 
the · 
Supreme Court reversed. 
The answer given by this Court will have an effect on 
matters concerning the finality of a judgment of the lower court: 
of this State and the presumptions surrounding that judgment. T:.l 
answer must reach the matter of the duration and effect of a lis 
pendens and the interaction of supersedeas procedures. 
In reaching its decision here, the Court must be mindfcl 
real I 
promot 
that its duty is to provide certainty and not confusion in 
property titles, and it must seek that solution which will 
the free alienation of property. 
It is the belief of the appellant, International Envirc 
mental Sciences, that a reversal of the lower court in this case 
will accomplish these desirable and necessary goals. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TITLE ACQUIRED 
BY APPELLANT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES WAS 
SUBJECT TO THE LATER REVERSAL OF THIS COURT AND, THERE-
FORE, INVALID. 
Dee Mills, a landowner, prevailed in the lower court 
against the option holder plaintiff. The lower court in an un-
equivocal judgment ruled that the option was invalid and that the 
title of Mills is good and valid. Feeling aggrieved, the option 
holder appealed to this Court. During the pendency of the appeal, 
in order to preserve the status quo, the option holder moved the 
Court to fix a supersedeas. However, when the Court set the amount 
of the supersedeas at $50,000.00 the courage of the option holder 
wavered. If the judgment of the lower court were affirmed, defen-
dants could easily have suffered $50,000.00 damage during the pen-
dency of the appeal. No bond was filed. Plaintiff elected to 
gamble. He took no risk. As it has now turned out, all of the risk 
was upon the defendants who took title in reliance upon the validity 
and finality of the lower court judgment which held that the option 
was invalid. 
After the reversal additional defendants, including 
this appellant, were joined in the lawsuit. They defended their 
title on the ground that the lis pendens did not go beyond the 
judgment of the lower court and that the plaintiff could not pre-
serve the status quo without filing a bond. The lower court 
-5-
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on the contrary ruled that the lis pendens has life and durabilit; 
beyond a lower court judgment and that personal knowledge of an 
appeal will subject a person dealing with the title to the effect 
of a later decree of reversal by an appellate court (Fdg. 12 _ R. I 
227). I 
Let us assume for the moment that this Court agreescw
010
·
5
u
1
'·:·j, 
the lower court and affirms this decision. The Court should 
some practical examples of future results of such a ruling. It wi: 
not matter what type of title we use. It could be fee title, leas'·j 
hold, mineral right, mining claim, mortgage or other lien, future 
1 
interest or whatever. For this example let us assume that the into 
est in real property in this case is a mining claim. Suit is brod 
by title breaker, claiming a prior right from an earlier locator. I 
A lis pendens is filed for record. The lower court, finding tl~ 
title breaker's predecessor in interest had not done assessment 
rules in favor of the owner of the claim and quiets title against 
the adverse claimant. The owner then receives a handsome offer fo:] 
I his claim, but the third party will not accept title and pay over I 
the money until the pending lis pendens is released. Landowner ttcj 
goes to title breaker and requests a release of lis pendens. Tit!' I 
breaker consults his lawyer, who advises him that his chances of i 
prevailing on appeal are not good, but that merely taking the appe':j 
will cloud the title and prevent a 
I 
sale of the mining claim or an;' 
mining activity. 
I 
Title breaker goes back to landowner and adri-: 
him that he will not release the lis pendens and is going to take' 
timely appeal to the Supreme Court. Landowner then goes to pros· 
-6-
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pective purchaser and asks for time. Purchaser is anxious to begin 
development and advises landowner that if a sale cannot be con-
summated within 90 days it will place its risk capital elsewhere. 
The result is that the landowner won against a spurious claim, and 
yet he loses because without any risk to himself the title breaker 
can effectively tie up the real property in question during the 
pendency of an appeal or until all possibility of an appeal has 
ceased to exist. 
The foregoing example might not seem of much compelling 
importance, but another example of critical significance exists in 
this State today. While not a matter of record in this case, it is 
a matter of common knowledge that the Ute Indians claim vast acreages 
outside the reservation and the claim embraces almost all of Duchesne 
County and part of Uintah County. So far only governmental control 
over those lands is sought. Certainly claim to title will follow. 
In other areas of the country various Indian tribes have claimed title 
to land where it was thought that the title had been settled for over 
two hundred years. The Indians in these matters are aided and en-
couraged by various groups including certain agencies of the United 
States government. The claims are not fanciful. One day they will 
have to be determined in the state and federal courts. 
Assume that the Indians claim title to all or practically 
all of Duchesne county, whether suit be filed or whether administrative 
, proceedings commence. Assume further that the Court ruled that the 
claim of title was without merit. It is easy to visualize appellate 
Proceedings grinding on endlessly through state and federal courts. 
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If the Supreme Court affirms the lower court in this case, then 
with that precedent the appeals we describe would be without ri~ 
The people of Duchesne County, although prevailing in the lowr 
court, would be the losers because no one would dare touch a t I l(,. 
until appellate proceedings were concluded. 
I 
The problem, of course, is how to balance the rights o'l 
litigants under a self executing decree or judgment such as is 
1 
here involved. A self executing decree is one determining statu• 
and requires no further implementation by court process. As an 
example, a decree denying a petition to oust a Board of Director: 
I 
is a self executing decree. Is the Board then free to act duri~ 
an appeal? What are the rights of third parties who deal with t' I 
Board in the interim during the pendency of the appeal? 
This has been a troublesome problem for the courts, anc 
treatment of the matter has not been uniform. Some courts have 
stated that the doctrine of supersedeas has no application to a 
self executing judgment or decree. \ 
Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527, 
534 (1911); Solorza v. Park Water Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d I 
37, 183 P. 2d 275 ( 2d Dist. 194 7) ; State ex rel Kaplan 1' 
Lamb, 239 Ind. 25, 154 N.E.2d 500 (1958); Willis V. I 
Willis, 165 Ind. 332, 75 N.E. 655 (1905); Archer v. Be. I 
of Educ., 251 Iowa 1077, 104 N.W.2d 621 (1960); Quinn 
v. Bechly, 243 IO\va 1185, 54 N.W. 2d 492 (1952); Hewitti 
v. Hawkeye Gas Co., 212 Iowa 316, 232 N.W. 835 (1930);.
1 
First Nat'l Bank v. Dutcher, 128 Iowa 413, 104 N.W. 49:1 
(1905); Haaland v. Verendrye Electric Coop., 66 N.W. ~~ 
902 (N.D. 1954); Sakraida v. Sakraida, 192 Ore. 217, , 
217 P.2d 242 (1950); Nichols v. Ingram, 75 Ore. 439, I;'! 
P. 988 (1915); Barnard v. Bd. of Educ., 19 wash. 8, 
52 P. 317 (1898) 
Other courts, sensing the basic unfairness involved, ~I 
-8-
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exercised what is called the court's "inherent power" to preserve 
the status quo pending an appeal. 
Blaustein v. Standard Oil Co., 43 Del. 238, 45 A.2d 
527 (1945); Palmer v. Harris, 230 Okla. 500, 101 P. 852 
(1909); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 160 
Va. 11, 168 S.E. 617 (1933); Banach v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 
2d 320, 143 N.W. 2d 13 (1966). 
Although the precise question posed by this appeal has 
not been determined by the Utah Supreme Court, nonetheless the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which have been adopted from the Federal 
Rules have codified the inherent power of the court and provided a 
very broad method that can be utilized by the court to preserve the 
status quo. All that is required is for the unsuccessful party in 
the lower court to act expeditiously and post an appropriate bond. 
The Rules obviously apply to self executing judgments and decrees. 
It is well that these Rules be reviewed at this point. 
Rule 62 
Stay Of Proceedings To Enforce A Judgment 
(a) Stay Upon Entry of Judgment. Execution or 
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue 
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless 
the court in its discretion and on such conditions 
for the security of the adverse party as are proper, 
otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on Motion for New Trial or for 
Judgment. In its discretion and on such conditions 
for the security of the adverse party as are proper, 
the court may stay the execution of, or any proceedings 
to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a 
motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment 
made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief 
from a judgment or order made pursuant to R~le 60, . 
or of a motion for judgment in accordance w1th a mot1on 
for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of 
a motion for amendment to the findings or for additional 
findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b) · 
-9-
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I 
(c) Injunction Pending Appeal. When an appeal I 
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granr. 
ing, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court~ 
its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant. 
an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon I 
such conditions as it considers proper for the securit. 
of the rights of the adverse party. I 
(d) Stay Upon Appeal. When an appeal is taken I 
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain, 
stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by la•) 
or these Rules. The bond may be given at or after the~ 
of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective·,l 
the supersedeas bond is approved by the court. 1 
(e) Stay in Favor of the State, or Agency Thereoi.'; 
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the Stat,\ 
of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by direc~~ 
of any department of either, and the operation or enfor1\ 
ment of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or 
other security shall be required from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in Quo Warranto Proceedings. Where the I 
defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding int·: I 
or unlawfully holding public office, civil or military, 
within this state, the execution of the judgment shall 
not be stayed on an appeal. 
(g) Power of Appellate Court not Limited. The 
provisions in this Rule do not limit any power of an ) 
appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to sta:l 
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspJ 
modify, restore, or grant an injunction, writ of mandatE\ 
or writ of prohibition during the pendency of an appeal) 
or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status 
1
. 
quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently 
to be entered. I 
(h) Stay of Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When I 
a court has ordered a final judgment on some but notall 
of the claims presented in the action under the condlt;ci 
stated in Rule 54 (b) , the court may stay enforcement or : 
that judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgmer:.; 
or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are r 
necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party ' 
in whose favor the judgment is entered. 
I 
(i) Excepting to Sureties; Justification; Multiple 
Sureties; Deposit in Lieu of Bond. The adverse party roo: 
except to the sufficiency of the sureties to the under· ) 
taking filed pursuant to the provisions of this Rule at 
-10-
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any time within ten days after written notice of the 
filin~ of s~ch.undertakings; and, unless they or other 
suretles, Wlthln ten days after service of the notice 
of such exception, justify before a judge of the court 
in which the judgment was entered, or the clerk thereof 
upon not less.than five d~ys notice to the party excepting 
to such suretles of the tlme and place of justification 
execution of the judgment is no longer stayed. In all ' 
cases where the bond required exceeds $2,000 and there 
are more than two sureties thereon, they may state in 
their affidavits that they are severally worth the amounts 
for which they agree to be bound if less than that expressed 
in the undertaking, provided the whole amount is equivalent 
to that of two sufficient sureties. . In all cases where an 
undertaking is required by these Rules a deposit in court 
in the amount of such undertaking, or such lesser amount 
as the court may order, is equivalent to the filing of 
the undertaking. 
Rule 73 
Procedure For Taking An Appeal 
* * * * * 
(d) Supersedeas Bond. Whenever an appellant entitled 
thereto desires a stay on appeal, he may present to the 
court for its approval a supersedeas bond which shall have 
such surety or sureties as the court requires. The bond 
shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the judgment 
in full together with costs, interest, and damages for 
delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or if 
the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full such 
modification of the judgment and such costs, interest, 
and damages as the appellate court may adjudge and award. 
When the judgment is for the recovery of money not other-
wise secured, the amount of the bond shall be fixed at 
such sum as will cover the whole amount of the judgment 
remaining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest, 
and damages for delay, unless the court after notice and 
hearing and good cause shown fixes a different amount 
or orders security other than the bond. When the judgment 
determines the disposition of the property in controversy 
as in real actions, replevin, and actions to foreclose 
mortgages or when such property is in the custody of the 
sheriff or when the proceeds of such property or a bond 
for its value is in the custody or control of the court, 
the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be fixed at such 
sum only as will secure the amount recovered for th7 use 
and detention of the property, the costs of the actlon, . 
costs on appeal, interest, and damages for delay. (Em~hasls 
supplied) 
-11-
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It is difficult to see how the lower court reached i~l 
decision in this case when the foregoing Rules are considered. 
It is even more difficult to see how the lower court reached ill 
decision when it was confronted with the fact that the plaintii' I 
had requested that supersedeas be fixed and failed to post t~ \ 
requisite bond after the court entered its order fixing the amo•:l 
I 
of the bond at $50,000.00. It should also be remembered that tr.'' 
conveyance here attacked by the plaintiff was not made until afu! 
plaintiff failed to post the bond. 
I The lower court was probably influenced by the factfu\ 
the plaintiff had filed for record a lis pendens at the time ~ 
initial proceedings were commenced. The Findings of the lower d. 
I 
(Fdg. 12 - R. 227) appear to indicate that the lower court hlll 
the lis pendens had life and durability beyond the entry of t~ ' 
original lower court judgment, which held that the option was . I u:.:, 
I 
The Findings also seem to indicate that Carole Lee Davis, the pr::·1 
cipal partner in appellant International Environmental Sciences, ·J 
. I 
knowledge of the pending appeal. This Finding by the court 15 nc: 1 
grounded in fact, and is not good law. 
On the matter of actual knowledge of the pending appeai,, 
Carole Lee Christensen testified: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Were you aware prior to January, say February 1 
of 1973, that the property was the subject of 
some litigation? 
Before when? 
Before February 1 of 1973. 
Well, I had read -- when I was interested in buyinc 
-12-
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the property I had read the court decree, so I 
guess, yes. 
THE COURT: The court what? 
THE WITNESS: The court decree. 
THE COURT: Where did you read it? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I was interested --when I was 
interested --
THE COURT: Where? Where did you see it? 
THE WITNESS: I saw it in my home. 
THE COURT: You didn't go to the courthouse and check 
the courthouse records? 
THE WITNESS: No, I didn't do that, it was brought to me. 
Q. (Mr. Garrett) Were you aware that there were any 
proceedings pending in the Supreme Court? 
A. No, I was not. 
transcript) 
(Tr. 226-227, Neil 0. Cooley 
The testimony of Carole Lee Christensen is uncontradicted 
in the Record. When she purchased the property for her limited 
partnership, International Environmental Sciences, she knew of the 
decree of the lower court ruling the option invalid because she saw 
it. She was unaware, however, of any appellate proceeding. 
The judgment of the lower court on this appeal can only 
be justified on the grounds that the lis pendens survives the 
original judgment and gives constructive notice to all persons 
even during the pendency of appellate proceedings. The consequences 
of this court's adopting such a view have already been explored 
earlier in this Brief, but now must be reiterated and considered 
with supersedeas procedures. 
-13-
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By affirming, this court would sanction the basic unfa.l 
I 
ness of allowing a losing appellant in a real property case, wit:j 
giving any security, to effectively remove real property from t'.', 
market for the entire amount of time consumed by the appeals prcc,\ 
The landowner who already has a judgment entered in his favor, a I 
judgment which is entitled to the protection of a presumption of 
1 
its correctness, is stymied in his use and development of the k.l 
I 
Additionally, the appellant would not be required to put up secur.:j 
even though the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provide a i 
method for maintaining the status quo in all cases during the I 
pendency of appeal. Why should a real property case such as this I 
be any different than where a party appeals from a money judgment I 
I 
against him? If he wishes to avoid execution, he must post adequ1:, 
security. I 
The question thus posed as to whether a lis pendens is 
effective beyond the entry of judgment has been answered in the 
negative by Utah law. 
The early Utah case of Dupee v. Salt Lake Val. Loan & 
Trust Co., 20 U. 103, 57 P. 845 states: 
.. The object of notice of lis pendens is to 
keep the subject of the suit, or res, within the pow~ 
and control of the court until the judgment or decree 
shall be entered, so that courts can give effect to thel: 
judgments, and that the public shall have notice of the 
pendency of the action. Lis pendens may be defined to 
be the jurisdiction, power, or control which courts 
acquire over property involved in a suit pending the 
continuance of the action, and until its final judgment 
therein. This constructive notice of filing the 
complaint as required by the statute is equivalent to 
actual notice. 
-14-
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J 
~ 
. I 
I 
9 
I 
This case states in effect that lis pendens is a legal 
device to enable the court to keep control of the res until the 
entry of judgment or decree. It does not say that it is a device 
to enable the court to keep control until some indefinite future 
time after the entry of the decree. 
The case goes on to state that lis pendens is the power 
a court has over property until its final judgment. 
In the jurisprudence of this state the term "final 
judgment" has always been defined to be that act of a lower court 
from which an appeal could be taken. 
Stubbs v. Third Judicial District Court, 150 P2d 783 (Utah) 
In re Voorhees' Estate, 12 U2d 361, 366 P2d 977 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 135 P. 919 (Utah) 
At the moment a judgment or decree is entered rights 
between parties are adjudicated, and that adjudication must be 
presumed to be correct. At that moment there is nothing pending 
before the court (unless issues were reserved or undetermined by 
the court, and that problem is not present here). There is no 
longer any need for the court to retain control of the property 
and, therefore, the purpose of lis pendens ceases to exist. 
The only remaining question is the effect of appellate 
proceedings. Appellate proceedings in this state do not alter 
the finality of a judgment. Rule 62(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, supra, provides that execution or other proceedings to 
enforce a judgment may issue immediately unless the court in its 
discretion otherwise directs. Clearly under Utah law the filing 
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of a Notice of Appeal does not stay execution on a judgment. 
Hence the filing of a Notice of Lis Pendens should not have 
! 
effect beyond the entry of judgment in the lower court. Compan 
36 A.L.R. 421 and 10 A.L.R. 415. The rationale of the cases cit:c' 
in those two annotations should be rejected by this court becau:,: 
of the failure of those cases to recognize the fundamental ~~~ 
ness of allowing the losing party in a title case to tie up the I 
property through the appellate process without posting supersede:~ 
Our court has adopted a very elaborate system to stay 
execution from the time the judgment is entered through appellat:l 
I 
proceedings. Rule 62 and Rule 73 (d) . Judgments in actions invo:vl 
title are clearly provided for in Rule 73 (d). To affirm in this I 
I 
case would be to say that in matters involving real property a l:s 
pendens will tie up property until appellate proceedings are con· I 
eluded. The basic unfairness will be perpetuated, and the rules 
of procedure ignored. 
The decision of this court should set forth the proced,;rl 
to be followed in matters involving title. A lis pendens filed i 
I 
pursuant to Title 78-40-2 will legally maintain matters in st~~: 
quo until the issues raised by the pleadings and the rights of ti.i: 
·I 
parties are adjudicated. Once the judgment or decree is enterea,: 
the losing party should not be able to stay proceedings until 
application is made to the District Court oi the Supreme court. 
Certainly this is not a cumbersome procedure. If the losing part!! 
in the lower court desires to maintain the status quo pending 
further hearing in the District Court or on appeal, he can ask 
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for a stay before judgment is entered. Upon giving appropriate 
security, the parties to that action can be enjoined from disposing 
of the real property until all later proceedings are ended. If 
he chooses not to obtain a stay by posting appropriate security, 
he should bear the risk of his gamble. He should not be allowed 
to recover the property from a third party. At that point if he 
gambles and wins he should then have to be satisfied with his 
remedy at law for damages. Notice of the appeal or lack of such 
notice, which seemed to impress the lower court, has absolutely no 
bearing on this principle. The decision we suggest gives effect 
to both the doctrine of lis pendens and the procedures available 
to obtain a stay subsequent to the entry of judgment. 
For a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the 
problems involved under this Point, see the article in 49 Notre 
Dame Lawyer 844 by Messrs. Robert Kratovil and Raymond J. Werner. 
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POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES AN AMOUNT COMMENSURATE WITH THE 
INCREASED VALUE ADDED TO THE LAND DURING ITS OCCUPANCY, 
In the event that the Court does not reverse and award 
title to International Environmental Sciences under the reasoning 
of Point I of this Brief the Court will then consider 
the matters here involved. 
The trial of this action was in two phases. The court 
first heard evidence relating to the purchase of the property by 
Carole Lee Davis (now Christensen) . (It should be explained that 
Carole Lee Davis is the principal party in the limited partner~~ I 
International Environmental Sciences. She married Milton Christen:ej 
I 
a short time after she acquired title to this property. Milton 
Christensen has been a party to these proceedings since they wen 
first instituted. However, as the record shmvs under Point I, Mrs. 
Christensen had no knowledge of the pendency of an appeal in this ' 
matter and the property was purchased with funds from her separate ~ 
estate. The record is clear on this point and it is not contro-
verted.) The court ruled at the conclusion of that phase of the 
hearing that plaintiff should be awarded title to the land. Ata 
subsequent hearing, the court awarded International Environmental 
Sciences the sum of $35,000 for value added to the property during 
the occupancy of defendants. 
If we read the Brief of Plaintiff, Hidden Meadows, correct! 
the amount of $35,000 is not disputed. The claim of plaintiff is 
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that a portion of the expenditures was made prior to the decision 
of Judge Wilkins and some made subsequent to the reversal by the 
Supreme Court; and that in all events the expenditures were made 
with knowledge that their title might be defeated and, therefore, 
the expenditures were not made in good faith as required by the 
statute. Plaintiff cites Utah cases on the subject in which, under 
the facts of those particular cases, it was held that the improve-
ments made by the occupying claimant were not made in good faith. 
Day v. Jones, 112 Utah 286, 187 P2d 181 
Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180 
Erickson v. Doekes, 120 Utah 653, 237 P2d 1012 
Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P2d 387 
What constitutes "good faith" in a case involving occupying 
claimants is not defined by our statute on the subject, nor by this 
Court. It is apparent from reviewing those cases that each case must 
stand on its own facts as to whether the occupying claimant was in 
good faith when improvements were made. The .decisions in those cases 
are sound and understandable. As an example, in the Day case and 
Erickson case the improvements were made under tax titles at a time 
when the claimant had been adequately informed that the record title 
holder had no intention of abandoning his title. The following 
litigation easily proved the tax title defective and invalid. 
However, the cases cited by plaintiff are distinguishable 
from this case. The improvements in this case were made under a 
title granted by the record title owner which had been reinforced 
by a judicial determination of the District Court that the option of 
-19-
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the plaintiff was invalid. The correct legal principle applic~h; 
to this case is set forth in 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Improvements, Section ' 
18: 
In some jurisdictions, protection has been extended . 
to one making improvements in good faith, in reliance 
upon a judicial order or decree awarding the land to him 
so as to allow him to recover compensation for the ' 
improvements upon the reversal or setting aside of the 
order. 
The defendants in this case had a right to rely upon the I 
validity and integrity of the judgment of the District Court. Tosa[ 
that they were not in good faith in making improvements under that 
circumstance is to invite legal anarchy. 
The good faith of defendants implicit in the Findings and I 
I 
Judgment of the court on this point (R. 238-241) is clearly supported 
I 
by the evidence. I 
We now ask the Court to consider the occupying claimant , 
statute in the light of conditions as they exist today on the 
Wasatch front communities. The increase in the number of people 
in the populous areas of the State has created tremendous pressure 
on the communi ties involved. Sandy City, Utah as an example is one 
of the fastest growing cities in the United States. With the dynami~ 
I 
of population growth we see land use changing. Open areas and agri· 
cultural lands become subdivisions, shopping centers, and industriai 
parks. We try to avoid haphazard development. We pass zoning laws . 
1 reds for that purpose. Not all growth is desirable, and many peop e · 
growth of any kind. Zoning laws by their very nature dictate land 
V 1 L d h 1 1 · f · b t and the arnoun: a ues. an as va ue on y l lt can e put o use, 
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of value is directly dependent upon the type of use to which it can 
be put. Land zoned agricultural has little value. Change the use to 
residential or commercial and, dependent upon demand of course, the 
value goes up dramatically. Changing the use of land through zoning 
processes is not easy. Community planners and city councils resist 
zoning change. For the developer it becomes an expensive and time 
consuming process to effect a change of use. A striking example of 
the problems inherent in zoning change is the area where this property 
is, the Heber Valley of Wasatch County. A county formerly pastural 
and with a small stable population has suddenly experienced an unpre-
cedented demand for housing. Growth, however, has been virtually 
stopped. There hasn't been a subdivision approved by the County for 
some years. Any use changes that have been effected result in 
dramatic increases in value. 
What does the foregoing comment have to do with the law 
of occupying claimant? 
The record shows that during the pendency of the appeal 
defendants were able to secure a change in use for a portion of 
the land in question from agricultural to residential. (Exh. 17-P, 
Tr. 32 Cooley Transcript). Exhibit 17-P is a small aerial photograph 
which was marked by the witness Christensen showing 80 acres involved 
in what was known as the Barnes Tract, and the Road and Mills lots. 
There are approximately 80 acres on the Barnes Tract, and approxi-
mately 90 acres on the Mills Tract. Whether the sale of lots on the 
Mills Tract was actually authorized by the County Commission is not 
altogether clear from the record. The testimony of Milton Christensen, 
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'i 
however, is to the effect that the County Commission actually aur. 
'·' 
ized the sale of not only the Barnes property but also the nine 
lots on the Mills Tract. 
The significance of this change in use is the dramatic 
increase in values. Portions of the Barnes property were sold dur.rq 
the pendency of appeal for amounts ranging from $1,000 to $1,400F,ri 
acre (Exhs. 20, 21, 22, 27, 28-D). 
The evidence shows that the option given plaintiff 
I 
I 
for tie. 
full 542 acres was at a price of $86,200.00 (Fdg. 15, R. 227}, 
Carole Lee Davis Christensen paid $110,000.00 for the land (Exh. 1!·1 
The evidence shows that the sale of only the 80 acres tha: 
I 
were re-zoned will bring a minimum of $80,000.00. The other 90 
acres would bring at least $1,000 per acre. These amounts would 
more than pay for the land for the plaintiff, leaving approximate!; 
370 acres free and clear. The position of the defendant in this 
case is that the re-zoning activities conducted by defendants resuite 
in an increase in the value of the land. 
This issue was properly presented to the lower court and 
squarely ruled upon. The lower court held specifically that the 
re-zoning obtained by defendant was not an item of improvement 
contemplated by the occupying claimant statute (Concl. Law 4, R. 
241). There are no reasons given by the lower court for its 
conclusion. 
There is, however, no reason why a change in zoning 
should not be considered as a valuable improvement to be recovered 
by the occupying claimant. 
-22-
t 
R 
p 
3 
e 
s 
$ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The statutes read: 
57-6-l. Stay of execution of judgment of possession. 
Where an occupant of real estate has color of title 
thereto, and in good faith has made valuable improvements 
thereon, and is afterwards in a proper action found not 
to be the owner, no execution shall issue to put the 
plaintiff in possession of the same after the filing of 
a complaint as hereinafter provided, until the provisions 
of this chapter have been complied with. 
57-6-2. Claimant to commence action--Complaint--
Trial of issues. Such complaint must set forth the 
grounds on which the defendant seeks relief, stating as 
accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, 
exclusive of the improvements thereon made by the 
claimant or his grantors, and the value of such improve-
ments. The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law 
actions, and the value of the real estate and of such 
improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial. 
There is no limiting language in those two sections of 
the statute and no definitions are set forth in the chapter. The 
Reimann case, supra, gives a general definition which supports the 
position defendants ask the Court to take in this case. From page 
391: 
.••. the occupying claimant's measure of recovery is 
the extent to which his improvements enhance the value 
of the land, or in other words, the difference between 
the reasonable relative values of the land with and with-
out the improvements. (Citing cases) 
The reasonable cost of the improvements, alone, is 
not sufficient evidence of value, but such cost may be 
considered together with all other evidence of value in 
determining the increase in value of the land on account 
of the improvements. (Citing cases) 
It seems clear that anything that is done to land that 
enhances its value should be considered an improvement under the 
statute. 
The lower court found that the value of the property was 
$221,000.00 (R. 240). This Finding does not include the re-zoning 
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because it was specifically excluded by the court in its Findings 
and Conclusions Of Law (R. 241). Based upon the lower court's fi:. 
ing of value, the land is worth approximately $500 per acre. For 
at least the 80 acres in question the land has a value by reason 
of sales of at least $1,000 per acre. There is, therefore, am~~ 
of approximately $500 per acre unaccounted for by the court on at 
least 80 acres. This amounts to some $40,000 to which the occupyq 
claimant is entitled. 
The principle we ask the Court to adopt, namely that 
re-zoning of property, if it enhances the value of the property, 
is an element to be recovered by the occupying claimant, is clear!· 
within the purview of the Reimann case, supra, and comports square::f 
with the underlying doctrine of occupying claimant which is to 
prevent unjust enrichment. 
Text book authority supports the position of defendant. ', 
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Improvements, Section 1. Generally 
speaking, the word "improvement" includes everything that 
permanently enhances the value of premises for general 
uses. The term includes, not only buildings and fixtures 
of all kinds, but many other things as well. Among the 
most common illustrations of such general improvements 
are the erection of a building; the replacing of old 
buildings with new ones; substantial repairs to a build-
ing or repairs necessary to preserve a building; the 
making of substantial additions to or changes in exist-
ing buildings; the construction of a necessary sidewalk 
alongside property; the erection of fences; the prepa~a­
tion of land for building sites; the preparation of ~1N 
or raw land for agricultural purposes; and the plantlng 
of a fruit orchard .... 
The text cites the cases of Kester v. Bostwick, 153 Fla. 
437, 15 So. 2d 201 (platting, grading, paving, and landscaping); 
and Kimmel v. Peach, 240 Mich. 697, 216 NW 374 involving surveying, 
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staking lots, seeding, and labor. 
A case in point is that of Town of Little Compton v. 
Round Meadows, Inc., 276 A2d 471 (R. I.). In this case the town 
attempted to enjoin the defendant from allowing parking of camper 
trailers on the defendant's land which abutted the Atlantic Ocean 
and had been used as a campground. 
The town points to the phrase "building or improve-
ment" and then declares that since the parking area set 
aside for the trailers contains no "building or improve-
ment," the southeasterly part of the parcel does not come 
within the shelter afforded by §45-24-10. In making 
this argument, the town cites nonconforming use provisions 
of the zoning enabling acts of other states wherein they 
specially safeguard the existing use of building, structures 
and land. 
The town, in making this contention, has misconceived 
the import of the term "improvement". It is a relative 
term whose meaning must be ascertained from the context 
and the subject matter of the instr~ent or writing in 
which it is used. Wolff Chemical Co. v. Philadelphia, 
217 Pa. 215, 66 A. 344. Little Compton obviously believes 
that unless a person has placed some type of structure or 
fixture on his land, he may not have the benefit of a 
nonconforming use. This is simply not so. As used in 
§45-24-10, the term "improvement" describes land which 
has been converted from its natural state to a different 
state and condition for the use and enjoyment of man. 
As we view the statute, such an improvement may consist 
of vacant land that has been improyed by some betterment 
such as cultivation, clearing, drainage, irrigation, 
grading or something which otherwise enhances the value 
or usefulness of the land. See, Johnson v. Gresham, 5 
Dana 542, (Ky. 1837); State ex rel, County of Ramsey v. 
Babcock, 186 Minn. 132, 242 N.W. 474. Even if we were 
to adopt the town's split view of the five acres in 
controversy, it is clear that the trailers were used on 
that portion of the premises which can be described as 
an "improvement." 
Defendants ask this Court to hold that re-zoning 
accomplished by an occupying claimant can be, and was in this case, 
an improvement which has enhanced the value of the land. 
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CONCLUSION 
Carole Lee Davis Christensen purchased this land in gocc 
faith, relying upon a judgment of the lower court which held that 1 
the option of plaintiff was invalid. 
A Motion to fix supersedeas was filed by claimant, and 
the court entered an Order thereon which reads in part: 
IT IS NOW THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED that the 
execution of and any proceedings to implement and 
enforce the Judgment entered herein on the lOth day of 
August, 1972, be stayed pending determination of plain-
tiff's appeal from such Judgment and the defendants, 
and each of them, are hereby enjoined and restrained 
from encumbering or transferring the real property 
described in the Complaint and which is the subject 
of the foregoing action pending such determination 
of plaintiff's appeal, provided that the plaintiff 
file and have approved by this court a bond in the soo 
of $50,000.00. • (R. 44) 
The bond was not posted. Carole Lee Davis Christensen 
I 
I 
purchased the land subsequent to that order. The initial defendan~l 
were not enjoined and restrained, and obviously had a right to seJ:[ 
I 
that property if they chose, and a third party such as Carole Lee 
Davis Christensen would have a right to rely on the judgment of 
1 
I 
the lower court. If that were not enough, she should certainly be 1 
able to rely. on the fact that the court later entered its order 
enjoining the sale of the property, but only if plaintiff posted 
a bond. 
The misconceptions and errors of the lower court in this 1 
matter must be reversed. 
In the event the Court disagrees with the reasoning of : 
appellant under Point I above, then we ask that the Court consider I 
-26- I 
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the fact that through the efforts of appellant a portion of the 
property was re-zoned and as a result thereof substantial value 
added to the land. We ask the Court to hold that re-zoning, if 
it adds value to land, is a proper element of recovery by an 
occupying claimant. The judgment of the lower court must, there-
fore, be reversed and the matter referred back for the purpose 
of increasing the amount awarded to defendant for i~~~ovements. 
Respectfully submitted~ 
' HANSO & GARRETT 
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